Starting small and renegotiation

DOI10.1006/JETH.1998.2487zbMath0919.90147OpenAlexW4254568663MaRDI QIDQ1289252

Joel Watson

Publication date: 27 May 1999

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1998.2487

zbMATH Keywords

two-sided incomplete informationlong-term partnership

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05)

Related Items (19)

Even up: maintaining relationships ⋮ Starting small to communicate ⋮ Building trust: the costs and benefits of gradualism ⋮ Starting small in project choice: a discrete-time setting with a continuum of types ⋮ Cooperation, punishment and immigration ⋮ OPTIMAL PAYMENT CONTRACTS IN TRADE RELATIONSHIPS ⋮ Too good to fire: non-assortative matching to play a dynamic game ⋮ Signaling in social network and social capital formation ⋮ Dynamic group formation in the repeated prisoner's dilemma ⋮ Endogenous institutional selection, building trust, and economic growth ⋮ Posterior renegotiation-proofness in a two-person decision problem ⋮ Long-term relationships as safeguards ⋮ Starting small and commitment ⋮ Building rational cooperation ⋮ Bargaining power in repeated games ⋮ Social games: matching and the play of finitely repeated games ⋮ A model of gradual information disclosure ⋮ Stag hunt with unknown outside options ⋮ Cooperation under incomplete information on the discount factors

Cites Work

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• Starting small and commitment
• An abstract two-period game with simultaneous signaling -- existence of separating equilibria
• Ratifiable mechanisms: Learning from disagreement
• Planning under Incomplete Information and the Ratchet Effect
• The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private Values
• Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
• Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal
• A Theory of Credibility
• Contract Renegotiation and Coasian Dynamics
• The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts
• The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values
• Dynamic Voluntary Contribution to a Public Project
• Joint Projects without Commitment

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