On coalition-proof Nash equilibria in common agency games
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Publication:1289254
DOI10.1006/jeth.1998.2481zbMath0920.90145OpenAlexW2007105740MaRDI QIDQ1289254
Hideo Konishi, Michel Le Breton, Shlomo Weber
Publication date: 27 May 1999
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1998.2481
Related Items (16)
Secure implementation in allotment economies ⋮ Two-Group Contests with Communication Within and Between Groups ⋮ Coalition-proofness and dominance relations ⋮ Coalition-proofness in a class of games with strategic substitutes ⋮ Profit-maximizing matchmaker ⋮ Complementary monopolies with asymmetric information ⋮ Coalition-proofness under weak and strong Pareto dominance ⋮ Efficiency and consistency for locating multiple public facilities ⋮ Multiproduct trading with a common agent under complete information: existence and characterization of Nash equilibrium ⋮ Organizational refinements of Nash equilibrium ⋮ Coalition-proof equilibria in a voluntary participation game ⋮ Farsightedness and cautiousness in coalition formation games with positive spillovers ⋮ Conflict and cooperation. The structure of equilibrium payoffs in common agency ⋮ Trading with a common agent under complete information: A characterization of Nash equilibria ⋮ On existence of equilibrium under social coalition structures ⋮ Compaign spending with office-seeking politicians, rational voters, and multiple lobbies
Cites Work
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- Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
- Equivalence of strong and coalition-proof Nash equilibria in games without spillovers
- On the sensitivity of von Neumann and Morgenstern abstract stable sets: The stable and the individual stable bargaining set
- Incremental cost sharing: Characterization by coalition strategy-proofness
- Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence
- Serial Cost-Sharing of Excludable Public Goods
- Conflict and cooperation. The structure of equilibrium payoffs in common agency
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