Far-sightedness and the voting paradox

DOI10.1006/jeth.1998.2466zbMath0919.90148OpenAlexW2065900709MaRDI QIDQ1289260

Bhaskar Chakravorti

Publication date: 27 May 1999

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1998.2466

zbMATH Keywords

stability setvoting gamesconsistently far-sighted voting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (6)

Committees with farsighted voters: A new interpretation of stable sets ⋮ Cooperation, stability and social welfare under majority rule ⋮ A core of voting games with improved foresight ⋮ SOCIAL CHOICE AND COOPERATIVE GAME THEORY: VOTING GAMES AS SOCIAL AGGREGATION FUNCTIONS ⋮ Coalitional stability with a credibility constraint ⋮ The stability set as a social choice correspondence.

Cites Work

• Social equilibrium and cycles on compact sets
• The stability set of voting games: Classification and genericity results
• Non-collegial simple games and the nowhere denseness of the set of preference profiles having a core
• Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
• On the core of voting games
• A consistent bargaining set
• Stability of decision systems under majority rule
• Farsighted coalitional stability
• Credible coalitions and the core
• A Note about the "Nowhere Denseness" of Societies Having an Equilibrium under Majority Rule

This page was built for publication: Far-sightedness and the voting paradox