A voluntary participation game with a non-excludable public good

DOI10.1006/jeth.1998.2476zbMath0919.90037OpenAlexW2048584336MaRDI QIDQ1289261

Takehiko Yamato, Tatsuyoshi Saijo

Publication date: 27 May 1999

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1998.2476

zbMATH Keywords

public goodsmechanism design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Public goods (91B18)

Related Items (16)

Non-excludable public good experiments ⋮ The coevolution of partner switching and strategy updating in non-excludable public goods game ⋮ Invitation games: an experimental approach to coalition formation ⋮ Coalition-proofness and dominance relations ⋮ Comparison of the voluntary contribution and Pareto-efficient mechanisms under voluntary participation ⋮ A voluntary participation game through a unit-by-unit cost share mechanism of a non-excludable public good ⋮ Participation and demand levels for a joint project ⋮ Steady-state stock and group size: an approach of dynamic voluntary provisions of public goods ⋮ The stable set of the social conflict game with commitments: existence, uniqueness, and efficiency ⋮ Coalition-proof equilibria in a voluntary participation game ⋮ Fundamental impossibility theorems on voluntary participation in the provision of non-excludable public goods ⋮ Equilibrium participation in public goods allocations ⋮ Moral hazard and free riding in collective action ⋮ The possibility of efficient provision of a public good in voluntary participation games ⋮ On incentive compatible, individually rational public good provision mechanisms ⋮ Group rewarding can promote cooperation and save costs in public goods games

Cites Work

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• Completely feasible and continuous implementation of the Lindahl correspondence with a message space of minimal dimension
• Implementing a public project and distributing its cost
• A simple model of imperfect competition where 4 are few and 6 are many
• Outcome Functions Yielding Walrasian and Lindahl Allocations at Nash Equilibrium Points
• Paradoxes of Preferential Voting
• A Simple Incentive Compatible Scheme for Attaining Lindahl Allocations
• Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the "Free Rider" Problem
• Serial Cost-Sharing of Excludable Public Goods

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