Sequential moves and tacit collusion: Reaction-function cycles in a finite pricing duopoly

DOI10.1006/JETH.1998.2484zbMath0919.90012OpenAlexW1977980181MaRDI QIDQ1289264

Klaus Wallner

Publication date: 27 May 1999

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/0b40e5bc52fdd93e05ff5f434a51fda0f02f44fa

zbMATH Keywords

Markov strategiesdynamic price-competition gamesfinite horizon, sequential move pricing duopoly

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Economic growth models (91B62) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Related Items (2)

Coordination need not be a problem ⋮ Asynchronous choice and Markov equilibria

Cites Work

• A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, II: Price Competition, Kinked Demand Curves, and Edgeworth Cycles

This page was built for publication: Sequential moves and tacit collusion: Reaction-function cycles in a finite pricing duopoly