Distribution of potential gains from international environmental agreements: The case of the greenhouse effect

DOI10.1006/JEEM.1996.0974zbMath0920.90029OpenAlexW2074738027MaRDI QIDQ1289627

Marta Escapa, María-José Gutiérrez

Publication date: 31 May 1999

Published in: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeem.1996.0974

zbMATH Keywords

Nash bargainingglobal environmental problemsinternational negotations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Discrete-time games (91A50) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

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