Nash implementation of a proportional solution to international pollution control problems

DOI10.1006/JEEM.1997.0991zbMath0930.91035OpenAlexW2025275968MaRDI QIDQ1289638

Johan Eyckmans

Publication date: 20 July 1999

Published in: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeem.1997.0991

zbMATH Keywords

coreratio equilibriumpollution controlproportional solutioncomplete information Nash equilibriumcost sharing game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

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An efficient and egalitarian negotiation procedure for economies with externalities ⋮ Implementing the efficient allocation of a persistent pollutant in the presence of threshold effects

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