Decomposable effectivity functions

DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(96)00831-1zbMath0943.91508OpenAlexW2031790849MaRDI QIDQ1290123

Ton Storcken, S. H. Tijs, Gertjan D. Otten, P. E. M. Borm

Publication date: 17 August 2000

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-4896(96)00831-1

zbMATH Keywords

TU gamesdecomposabilityechelon formeffectivity functionsrevealed power property

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory (91A99)

Cites Work

• The vetoers in a simple game with ordinal preferences
• Necessary and sufficient conditions for stability of effectivity functions
• Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Effectivity functions and simple games
• Voting with Proportional Veto Power
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
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