Multidimensional mechanism design for auctions with externalities

DOI10.1006/jeth.1998.2501zbMath1028.91539OpenAlexW2156477104MaRDI QIDQ1290839

Ennio Stacchetti, Philippe Jehiel, Benny Moldovanu

Publication date: 28 January 2004

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/100795

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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