Two notions of epistemic validity. Epistemic models for Ramsey's conditionals

DOI10.1007/BF00413768zbMath0934.03023OpenAlexW2886801669MaRDI QIDQ1292997

K. Appert

Publication date: 25 April 2000

Published in: Synthese (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00413768

zbMATH Keywords

belief revisionRamsey testAGM theoryacceptability of conditionalsepistemic validitynegative validitypositive validityRamsey's conditionals

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42)

Related Items (10)

New surprises for the Ramsey test ⋮ From epistemic norms to logical rules: epistemic models for logical expressivists ⋮ AN EXPRESSIVIST ANALYSIS OF THE INDICATIVE CONDITIONAL WITH A RESTRICTOR SEMANTICS ⋮ AGM 25 years. Twenty-five years of research in belief change ⋮ An internal version of epistemic logic ⋮ FORMAL EPISTEMOLOGY, CONTEXT AND CONTENT: INTRODUCTION TO SPECIAL ISSUE ON RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN FORMAL EPISTEMOLOGY ⋮ BELIEF-REVISION, THE RAMSEY TEST, MONOTONICITY, AND THE SO-CALLED IMPOSSIBILITY RESULTS ⋮ Irrevocable belief revision in dynamic doxastic logic ⋮ Indicative conditionals and graded information ⋮ Belief revision conditionals: basic iterated systems

Cites Work

• Variations on the Ramsey test: More triviality results
• Subjunctives, dispositions and chances
• Conditionals and monotonic belief revisions: The success postulate
• For the Sake of the Argument
• The Ramsey test revisited*
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