Asymmetric information in a competitive market game: Reexamining the implications of rational expectations
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Publication:1293742
DOI10.1007/s001990050272zbMath0943.91019OpenAlexW2087884108MaRDI QIDQ1293742
Matthew O. Jackson, James Peck
Publication date: 29 June 1999
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990050272
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