Strategy-proofness versus efficiency for small domains of preferences over public goods

DOI10.1007/s001990050277zbMath0942.91024OpenAlexW2076978348MaRDI QIDQ1293748

James Schummer

Publication date: 29 June 1999

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990050277

zbMATH Keywords

public goodsstrategy-prooflotteries

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18) Individual preferences (91B08)

Related Items (13)

The structure of decision schemes with cardinal preferences ⋮ Impossibilities for strategy-proof committee selection mechanisms with vetoers ⋮ Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for economies with public goods ⋮ Egalitarian division under Leontief preferences ⋮ On mechanisms eliciting ordinal preferences ⋮ Eliciting preferences to assign positions and compensation ⋮ Fractional matching markets ⋮ Egalitarian equivalence and strategyproofness in the queueing problem ⋮ A mechanism design approach to allocating central government funds among regional development agencies ⋮ Strategy-proof location on a network ⋮ The impossibility of strategy-proof, Pareto efficient, and individually rational rules for fractional matching ⋮ Differentiable strategy-proof mechanisms for private and public goods in domains that are not necessarily large or quasi-linear ⋮ On the terminology of economic design: a critical assessment and some proposals

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