Strategic play and adaptive learning in the sealed-bid bargaining mechanism
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Publication:1293895
DOI10.1006/jmps.1998.1220zbMath0927.91002OpenAlexW2044984751WikidataQ36898090 ScholiaQ36898090MaRDI QIDQ1293895
Darryl A. Seale, Amnon Rapoport, Terry E. Daniel
Publication date: 13 December 1999
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Psychology (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jmps.1998.1220
Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
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