An implementation-theoretic approach to non-cooperative foundations
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Publication:1294004
DOI10.1006/jeth.1998.2505zbMath0941.91009OpenAlexW2045796744MaRDI QIDQ1294004
Publication date: 29 June 1999
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/273398/files/qed_wp_964.pdf
equilibriumcooperative solutionnegotiationcoalition formation\(\alpha\)-effectivity\(\beta\)-effectivity
Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Related Items (10)
Spoilers, blocking coalitions, and the core ⋮ Nash implementation and the bargaining problem ⋮ UNIQUE NASH IMPLEMENTATION FOR A CLASS OF BARGAINING SOLUTIONS ⋮ Socio-legal systems and implementation of the Nash solution in Debreu-Hurwicz equilibrium ⋮ An exact non-cooperative support for the sequential Raiffa solution ⋮ On Maskin monotonicity of solution based social choice rules ⋮ Characterization of dominance relations in finite coalitional games ⋮ Two support results for the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution in small object division markets ⋮ Dominant strategy implementation of bargaining solutions ⋮ USING THE ASPIRATION CORE TO PREDICT COALITION FORMATION
Cites Work
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