Incomplete information, incentive compatibility, and the core

DOI10.1006/jeth.1999.2512zbMath0939.91079OpenAlexW2079653883MaRDI QIDQ1294008

Rajiv Vohra

Publication date: 29 June 1999

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/c40714e721eb043009d89a4297c24cb1e474bc78

zbMATH Keywords

corecontractsexchange economy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Related Items (43)

\(Interim\) core concepts for a Bayesian pure exchange economy ⋮ Information transmission in coalitional voting games ⋮ Agency equilibrium ⋮ The incentive compatible coarse core when information is almost complete. ⋮ Stable matching under forward‐induction reasoning ⋮ Signaling, screening, and core stability ⋮ Information in Tullock contests ⋮ Small Informational Size and Interim Cores of Large Quasilinear Economies ⋮ Non-cooperative bargaining and the incomplete informational core ⋮ Equilibrium and revenue in a family of common-value first-price auctions with differential information ⋮ Informational size and the incentive compatible coarse core in quasilinear economies ⋮ Feasible mechanisms in economies with type-dependent endowments ⋮ The farsighted core in a political game with asymmetric information ⋮ Informational size, incentive compatibility, and the core of a game with incomplete information. ⋮ Transferable utility games with uncertainty ⋮ The \textit{ex ante} incentive compatible core of the assignment game. ⋮ Virtual utility and the core for games with incomplete information ⋮ Group stability in matching with interdependent values ⋮ Core, equilibria and incentives in large asymmetric information economies ⋮ Stability with one-sided incomplete information ⋮ The non-emptiness of the weak sequential core of a transferable utility game with uncertainty ⋮ The value of public information in common-value Tullock contests ⋮ Some new characterization of rational expectation equilibria in economies with asymmetric information ⋮ Core concepts in economies where information is almost complete ⋮ A note on the incentive compatible core ⋮ Core convergence with asymmetric information ⋮ Core-stable rings in auctions with independent private values ⋮ Market games with asymmetric information: the core ⋮ Monopolists of scarce information and small group effectiveness in large quasilinear economies ⋮ A note on the individualistic foundations of the core in economies with asymmetric information ⋮ Common-value group contests with asymmetric information ⋮ On the core of an economy with differential information ⋮ Common certainty and efficiency with incomplete information ⋮ COOPERATIVE GAMES WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION: SOME OPEN PROBLEMS ⋮ Incomplete information, credibility and the core ⋮ Dominance solvability of second-price auctions with differential information ⋮ Information advantage in Cournot oligopoly ⋮ Blocking coalitions and fairness in asset markets and asymmetric information economies ⋮ Incentives and the core of an exchange economy: a survey. ⋮ The core of economies with asymmetric information: An axiomatic approach. ⋮ The anonymous core of an exchange economy. ⋮ The strong sequential core for two-period economies ⋮ Two-period economies with price-contingent deliveries

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