Can pre-arranged matches be avoided in two-sided matching markets?
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Publication:1294009
DOI10.1006/jeth.1999.2507zbMath0947.91078OpenAlexW2093056254MaRDI QIDQ1294009
Publication date: 15 September 1999
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/d030217be0250c904d66834edaf4a71798a1f370
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