On non-Nash equilibria

DOI10.1006/game.1998.0664zbMath0945.91002OpenAlexW2026594420MaRDI QIDQ1294032

Mario Gilli

Publication date: 1 October 2000

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1998.0664

zbMATH Keywords

conjectural equilibriumrationalizable conjectural equilibriumstrong rationalizable conjectural equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Games involving topology, set theory, or logic (91A44)

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