Finite horizon bargaining and the consistent field

DOI10.1006/game.1998.0665zbMath1028.91509OpenAlexW2168043073WikidataQ56936142 ScholiaQ56936142MaRDI QIDQ1294033

Armando Gomes, Sergiu Hart, Andreu Mas-Colell

Publication date: 29 June 1999

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10230/463

zbMATH Keywords

subgame perfectionnontransferable utilityconsistent vector fieldnoncooperative bargaining games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06)

Related Items (3)

The procedural value for cooperative games with non-transferable utility ⋮ A characterization of a limit solution for finite horizon bargaining problems ⋮ Supporting others and the evolution of influence.

Cites Work

• Ståhl's bargaining model
• The demand commitment bargaining and snowballing cooperation
• The consistent Shapley value for hyperplane games
• Harsanyi values of large economies: Nonequivalence to competitive equilibria
• The Bargaining Problem
• Bargaining Foundations of Shapely Value
• Bargaining and Value
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item

This page was built for publication: Finite horizon bargaining and the consistent field