An empirical model of strategic choice with an application to coordination games

DOI10.1006/game.1998.0678zbMath0926.91004OpenAlexW2055346511MaRDI QIDQ1294105

Debra J. Holt

Publication date: 11 November 1999

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/273257/files/qed_wp_863.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

coordination gamesmyopic learning

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

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Cites Work

• The scope of the hypothesis of Bayesian equilibrium
• Vertigo: Comparing structural models of imperfect behavior in experimental games
• Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term
• On players' models of other players: Theory and experimental evidence
• Boundedly rational rule learning in a guessing game
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• An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game