Reexamination of the international export quota game through the theory of social situations

DOI10.1006/GAME.1998.0677zbMath0926.91032OpenAlexW2004120397MaRDI QIDQ1294108

Noritsugu Nakanishi

Publication date: 11 November 1999

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/275228

zbMATH Keywords

export quota gameinternational tadequota retaliationsocial situationstable standard of behavior

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Trade models (91B60) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Related Items (10)

Myopic and farsighted stable sets in 2-player strategic-form games ⋮ Farsightedly stable tariffs ⋮ Cooperative Games (Von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Sets) ⋮ Stability, sequential rationality, and subgame consistency ⋮ Noncooperative farsighted stable set in an \(n\)-player prisoners' dilemma ⋮ Conservative stable standards of behavior and \(\varphi\)-stable sets ⋮ General systems and \(\varphi\)-stable sets --- a formal analysis of socioeconomic environments ⋮ On the foundation of stability ⋮ Reexamination of the international export quota game through the theory of social situations ⋮ Roth-Postlewaite stability and von Neumann-Morgenstern stability

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Reexamination of the international export quota game through the theory of social situations
• Pareto optimality and optimistic stability in repeated extensive form games

This page was built for publication: Reexamination of the international export quota game through the theory of social situations