Prosperty properties of TU-games

DOI10.1007/s001820050106zbMath0941.91008OpenAlexW2056481063MaRDI QIDQ1295843

J. R. G. van Gellekom, J. H. Reijnierse, Jos A. M. Potters

Publication date: 5 October 1999

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820050106

zbMATH Keywords

cooperative gameslarge corestable coretransferable utility gamecharacteristic function formprosperityVon Neumann-Morgenstern solution

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (23)

STABILITY OF THE CORE IN A CLASS OF NTU GAMES: A CHARACTERIZATION ⋮ A NOTE ON CHARACTERIZING CORE STABILITY WITH FUZZY GAMES ⋮ Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets of a patent licensing game: the existence proof ⋮ On some families of cooperative fuzzy games ⋮ The aggregate-monotonic core ⋮ Lexicographic allocations and extreme core payoffs: the case of assignment games ⋮ New characterizations for largeness of the core ⋮ ON BARGAINING SETS IN SYMMETRIC GAMES ⋮ Characterization of TU games with stable cores by nested balancedness ⋮ On balanced games with infinitely many players: revisiting Schmeidler's result ⋮ Minimal large sets for cooperative games ⋮ A note: characterizations of convex games by means of population monotonic allocation schemes ⋮ Extendability and von neuman-morgenstern stability of the core ⋮ Core stability in chain-component additive games ⋮ Stability and largeness of the core ⋮ ON THE SEMIVALUES AND THE POWER CORE OF COOPERATIVE TU GAMES ⋮ Algorithms for core stability, core largeness, exactness, and extendability of flow games ⋮ Monotonicity and egalitarianism ⋮ On core stability, vital coalitions, and extendability ⋮ Stable cores in information graph games ⋮ Large cores and exactness ⋮ Concave integral with respect to imprecise probabilities ⋮ The bargaining set for almost-convex games

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