Assessing the truth axiom under incomplete information
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Publication:1296382
DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(98)00006-7zbMath0957.03018WikidataQ114012798 ScholiaQ114012798MaRDI QIDQ1296382
Klaus Nehring, Giacomo Bonanno
Publication date: 2 August 1999
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Logic in artificial intelligence (68T27) Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42) Knowledge representation (68T30)
Related Items (5)
Common belief of rationality in games of perfect information ⋮ Epistemic characterizations of iterated deletion of inferior strategy profiles in preference-based type spaces ⋮ Community-based reasoning in games: salience, rule-following, and counterfactuals ⋮ PEOPLE WITH COMMON PRIORS CAN AGREE TO DISAGREE ⋮ On the logic and role of negative introspection of common belief
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