Asymptotically strategy-proof Walrasian exchange

DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(98)00038-9zbMath0930.91010OpenAlexW2128971283WikidataQ127628704 ScholiaQ127628704MaRDI QIDQ1296450

Peter J. Hammond, José M. Córdoba

Publication date: 2 August 1999

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-4896(98)00038-9

zbMATH Keywords

strategy-proofnessmechanism designcontinuum of agentsnon-Walrasian mechanismssmooth exchange economiessmooth random exchange economiesWalrasian mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items

The relationship between the allocation of goods and a seller's revenue ⋮ The generalized random priority mechanism with budgets ⋮ Threshold strategy-proofness: on manipulability in large voting problems ⋮ Least manipulable envy-free rules in economies with indivisibilities ⋮ Envy-freeness and implementation in large economies ⋮ Almost-dominant strategy implementation: exchange economies ⋮ Simple strategy-proof approximately Walrasian mechanisms

Cites Work

• Market demand. An analysis of large economics with non-convex preferences
• Asymptotic efficiency of the pivotal mechanism with general project space
• Concepts of similarity for utility functions
• Fair allocations in large economies
• The speed of convergence of prices in random exchange economies
• Asymptotic efficiency of the demand revealing mechanism
• Approximately competitive equilibria in large finite economies
• Tax systems and direct mechanisms in large finite economies
• Implementation in Economies with a Continuum of Agents
• A Note on Incentives in Large Economies
• The Incentives for Price-Taking Behavior in Large Exchange Economies
• Competitive Exchange
• Straightforward Individual Incentive Compatibility in Large Economies
• Strategy-Proof Exchange
• Markets with a Continuum of Traders
• Existence of Competitive Equilibria in Markets with a Continuum of Traders
• An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item

This page was built for publication: Asymptotically strategy-proof Walrasian exchange