Strategy-proofness and single-plateaued preferences

DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(97)00036-XzbMath0958.91012MaRDI QIDQ1296477

Dolors Berga

Publication date: 16 April 2001

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

strategy-proofnessvoting schemesstrategy-proof voting schemesprovision of one pure public goodsingle-plateaued preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (19)

Single-plateaued choice ⋮ On Nash implementability in allotment economies under domain restrictions with indifference ⋮ Arrow on domain conditions: a fruitful road to travel ⋮ Resource allocation mechanisms based on strategy-proof symmetrical anonymous voting procedures with delegation ⋮ Maximal domain for strategy-proof rules in allotment economies ⋮ Representing a sequential allotment rule in the form of a strategy-proof mechanism of multicriteria active expertise ⋮ Single-basined choice ⋮ ON STRATEGY‐PROOFNESS AND THE SALIENCE OF SINGLE‐PEAKEDNESS ⋮ A unified characterization of the randomized strategy-proof rules ⋮ Maximal domain for strategy-proof rules with one public good ⋮ Public decisions: solidarity and the status quo ⋮ Incentive compatibility and strategy-proofness of mechanisms of organizational behavior control: retrospective, state of the art, and prospects of theoretical research ⋮ Maximal domain of preferences in the division problem ⋮ Strategic requirements with indifference: single-peaked versus single-plateaued preferences ⋮ Fuzzy politics. I: The genesis of parties ⋮ Strategy-proof probabilistic rules for expected utility maximizers ⋮ Strategy-proofness and single-plateaued preferences ⋮ Social Choice Theory ⋮ Nash implementation in private good economies with single-plateaued preferences and in matching problems

Cites Work

• Strategy-proofness and single-plateaued preferences
• Generalized median voter schemes and committees
• A characterization of strategy-proof social choice functions for economies with pure public goods
• Maximal domain for strategy-proof rules with one public good
• Generalized Condorcet-winners for single peaked and single-plateau preferences
• Straightforward Elections, Unanimity and Phantom Voters
• Impossibility of Strategy-Proof Mechanisms in Economies with Pure Public Goods

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