Implementable stable solutions to pure matching problems

DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(97)00037-1zbMath0929.91038WikidataQ127647245 ScholiaQ127647245MaRDI QIDQ1296478

Manabu Toda, Koichi Tadenuma

Publication date: 2 August 1999

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

stabilitymatchingNash equilibriaMaskin monotonicity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (8)

AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF FINANCIAL SUPPORT AFTER DIVORCE ⋮ Partnership-enhancement and stability in matching problems ⋮ Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization ⋮ An incompatibility between recursive unanimity and strategy-proofness in two-sided matching problems ⋮ Monotonicity and consistency in matching markets ⋮ Strong implementation with partially honest individuals ⋮ Nash implementation in private good economies with single-plateaued preferences and in matching problems ⋮ Implementation by self-relevant mechanisms: Applications.

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• On constant Maskin monotonic social choice functions
• Consistency and characterization of the core of two-sided matching problems
• Top dominance and the possibility of strategy-proof stable solutions to matching problems
• The implementation of social choice functions via social choice correspondences: A general formulation and a limit result
• Nash implementation of matching rules
• Implementation of stable solutions to marriage problems
• The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

This page was built for publication: Implementable stable solutions to pure matching problems