Incentive-compatibility in large games

DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(97)00023-1zbMath1028.91514OpenAlexW2126749540WikidataQ126649306 ScholiaQ126649306MaRDI QIDQ1296488

Klaus Nehring

Publication date: 23 September 1999

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-4896(97)00023-1

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibrialarge gamesBayesian Nash equilibriacountably infinite number of players

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games with infinitely many players (91A07)

Cites Work

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