Minimizing the mean majority deficit: The second square-root rule
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Publication:1296507
DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(98)00011-0zbMath0953.91005OpenAlexW2161740398MaRDI QIDQ1296507
Dan S. Felsenthal, Moshé Machover
Publication date: 1 February 2001
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-4896(98)00011-0
Banzhaf power indexequal suffragemajoritarianismmean majority deficitsimple voting gamesquare-root rulestwo-tier decision-making
Related Items (9)
Majority Efficient Representation of the Citizens in a Federal Union ⋮ Fair representation and a linear Shapley rule ⋮ Welfare ordering of voting weight allocations ⋮ A note on the direct democracy deficit in two-tier voting ⋮ Gerrymander-proof representative democracies ⋮ Voting and Power ⋮ Square Root Voting System, Optimal Threshold and $$ \uppi $$ π ⋮ Egalitarianism and utilitarianism in committees of representatives ⋮ Collective bias models in two-tier voting systems and the democracy deficit
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