On \(\lambda\)-majority voting paradoxes

DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(98)00012-2zbMath0944.91017MaRDI QIDQ1296508

József Mala

Publication date: 26 September 2000

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

tournamentsalternatives\(\lambda\)-majority relationMcGarvey's theorem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Directed graphs (digraphs), tournaments (05C20)

Related Items (6)

A characterization of the \(n\)-agent Pareto dominance relation ⋮ Smallest tournaments not realizable by \({\frac{2}{3}}\)-majority voting ⋮ A conjecture on the construction of orderings by Borda's rule ⋮ Construction of voting situations concordant with ranking patterns ⋮ An extension of McGarvey's theorem from the perspective of the plurality collective choice mechanism ⋮ Majority decisions when abstention is possible

Cites Work

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• Logrolling and a McGarvey theorem for separable tournaments
• The Voting Problem
• On Sets of Consistent Arcs in a Tournament

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