Beta distributions in a simplex and impartial anonymous cultures

DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(98)00016-XzbMath0946.91008WikidataQ115927415 ScholiaQ115927415MaRDI QIDQ1296509

Eivind Stensholt

Publication date: 25 October 2000

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

preference structuresbeta distributionsCondorcet's paradoximpartial anonymous cultures

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Individual preferences (91B08)

Related Items (4)

Voting with rubber bands, weights, and strings ⋮ Bayesian estimation for a mixture of simplex distributions with an unknown number of components: HDI analysis in Brazil ⋮ The Condorcet efficiency of Borda Rule with anonymous voters ⋮ Which scoring rule maximizes condorcet efficiency under IAC?

Cites Work

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• The Borda method is most likely to respect the Condorcet principle
• Probabilities of preferences and cycles with super majority rules
• Circle Pictograms for Vote Vectors

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