Meaningful cheap talk must improve equilibrium payoffs

DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(98)00018-3zbMath0937.91012OpenAlexW2118538350WikidataQ126651886 ScholiaQ126651886MaRDI QIDQ1296513

V. Pereyra

Publication date: 14 June 2000

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-4896(98)00018-3

zbMATH Keywords

communicationequilibriumcheap talkPareto superior

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) 2-person games (91A05)

Related Items (2)

Do actions speak louder than words? An experimental comparison of observation and cheap talk ⋮ Contract and game theory: basic concepts for settings with finite horizons

Cites Work

• Communication, coordination and Nash equilibrium
• Cheap-talk and cooperation in a society
• Cheap talk games may have unique, informative equilibrium outcomes
• Cheap talk can matter in bargaining
• A model of pre-game communication
• Communication and superior cooperation in two-player normal form games
• Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept

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