Optimal selling mechanisms for multiproduct monopolists: Incentive compatibility in the presence of budget constraints

DOI10.1016/S0304-4068(97)00049-9zbMath0937.91051OpenAlexW1985207685WikidataQ127125222 ScholiaQ127125222MaRDI QIDQ1300369

Frank H. jun. Page, Paulo Klinger Monteiro

Publication date: 10 May 2000

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-4068(97)00049-9

zbMATH Keywords

nonlinear pricingbudget constraintsmultiproduct monopolists

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (10)

A necessary optimality condition in two-dimensional screening ⋮ The monopolist's problem: existence, relaxation, and approximation ⋮ Existence of solutions to principal-agent problems with adverse selection under minimal assumptions ⋮ Mechanism design to the budget constrained buyer: a canonical mechanism approach ⋮ Complementary monopolies with asymmetric information ⋮ When is multidimensional screening a convex program? ⋮ Convexity and multi-dimensional screening for spaces with different dimensions ⋮ A general existence result for the principal-agent problem with adverse selection ⋮ Existence in multidimensional screening with general nonlinear preferences ⋮ Dangerous tangents: an application of \(\Gamma\)-convergence to the control of dynamical systems

Cites Work

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• Multidimensional incentive compatibility and mechanism design
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• A selection theorem for optimization problems
• Mechanism design for general screening problems with moral hazard
• Optimal contract mechanisms for principal-agent problems with moral hazard and adverse selection
• Optimal auction with financially constrained buyers
• Monopoly pricing
• A new proof of the existence of equilibrium in incomplete market economies
• Measurable relations
• Measurable Selection and Dynamic Programming
• Multiproduct Nonlinear Pricing

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