Repeated games with \(M\)-period bounded memory (pure strategies)

DOI10.1016/S0304-4068(97)00061-XzbMath0972.91015OpenAlexW2045858173MaRDI QIDQ1300377

Hamid Sabourian

Publication date: 19 November 2001

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-4068(97)00061-x

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamesbounded rationalitymemory

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items

A one-period memory folk theorem for multilateral bargaining games, Bounded memory folk theorem, Limited records and reputation bubbles, Folk theorems with bounded recall under (almost) perfect monitoring, Memory-two strategies forming symmetric mutual reinforcement learning equilibrium in repeated prisoners' dilemma game, Playing off-line games with bounded rationality, Repeated games with one-memory, Finite memory and imperfect monitoring, Asynchronous choice and Markov equilibria

Cites Work

• Equilibrium in supergames with the overtaking criterion
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
• Normal Recurring Decimals
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item