Moral hazard and conditional preferences

DOI10.1016/S0304-4068(97)00065-7zbMath1057.91501OpenAlexW2023566025WikidataQ126527857 ScholiaQ126527857MaRDI QIDQ1300407

Jacques H. Drèze, Aldo Rustichini

Publication date: 1999

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-4068(97)00065-7

zbMATH Keywords

Decision theoryMoral hazardConditional expected utility theory

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Utility theory (91B16) Individual preferences (91B08)

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Foundations of Bayesian theory, Core and equilibria under ambiguity, Whom should we believe? aggregation of heterogeneous beliefs, A reformulation of the maxmin expected utility model with application to agency theory

Cites Work

• Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior
• On State Dependent Preferences and Subjective Probabilities
• Conditioning and Aggregation of Preferences
• A Mixture-Set Axiomatization of Conditional Subjective Expected Utility
• Characterizations of Conditional Expectations
• Convex Analysis
• Conditional Expected Utility
• A Definition of Subjective Probability
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