Nash implementation and double implementation: Equivalence theorems
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Publication:1300409
DOI10.1016/S0304-4068(97)00054-2zbMath0947.91004MaRDI QIDQ1300409
Publication date: 1 September 1999
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Related Items (3)
Implementation by self-relevant mechanisms ⋮ A simple mechanism for double implementation with semi-socially-responsible agents ⋮ Double implementation without no-veto-power
Cites Work
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- On the necessary and sufficient conditions for Nash implementation
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