Long-sighted principal and myopic agents

DOI10.1016/S0304-4068(97)00037-2zbMath0941.91039MaRDI QIDQ1300431

Guy Laroque, Gabrielle Demange

Publication date: 1 September 1999

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

capital accumulationrisk sharingincentive constraintsmyopia

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Related Items (1)

Principal–Agent Theory, Game Theory, and the Precautionary Principle

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Some results on An income fluctuation problem
• Invariant Distributions and the Limiting Behavior of Markovian Economic Models
• Stochastic Monotonicity and Stationary Distributions for Dynamic Economies
• Optimal Economic Growth and Uncertainty: The No Discounting Case

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