Cones of cooperation, Perron-Fröbenius theory and the indefinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma

DOI10.1016/S0304-4068(97)00021-9zbMath0941.91012MaRDI QIDQ1300434

Michael A. Jones

Publication date: 1 September 1999

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamesPerron-Frobenius theoryKrein-Rutman theoremprisoners' dilemmacontinuation probability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Positive linear operators and order-bounded operators (47B65) Applications of operator theory in optimization, convex analysis, mathematical programming, economics (47N10)

Related Items

Repeated games with probabilistic horizon

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• The Perron-Frobenius theorem without additivity
• The graph of Prisoners' Dilemma supergame payoffs as a function of the discount factor
• Repeated games with asymptotically finite horizons
• Transformations of spaces of infinitely many dimensions
• On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
• Compatible Measures and Merging
• Balanced Growth under Constant Returns to Scale