Existence of optimal auctions in general environments

DOI10.1016/S0304-4068(97)00015-3zbMath0939.91051OpenAlexW2170248597MaRDI QIDQ1300508

Frank H. jun. Page

Publication date: 10 May 2000

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-4068(97)00015-3

zbMATH Keywords

Bayesian incentive compatibilityoptimal auctionsrelative \(K\)-compactness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items

Optimal auction with a general distribution: virtual valuation without densities, A note on the continuity of the optimal auction, Data envelopment analysis approaches for two-level production and distribution planning problems

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