Existence of optimal auctions in general environments
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Publication:1300508
DOI10.1016/S0304-4068(97)00015-3zbMath0939.91051OpenAlexW2170248597MaRDI QIDQ1300508
Publication date: 10 May 2000
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-4068(97)00015-3
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)
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