Marginalist and efficient values for TU games

DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(98)00045-6zbMath0941.91010MaRDI QIDQ1303881

Anna B. Khmelnitskaya

Publication date: 2 August 2000

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

cooperative gamesefficiencyShapley valueaxiomatic characterizationtransferable utility gamemarginalismgame valuecharacteristic function form

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (3)

A discrete cost sharing model with technological cooperation ⋮ A non-parametric approach to testing the axioms of the Shapley value with limited data ⋮ Three methods to share joint costs or surplus

Cites Work

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• Monotonic solutions of cooperative games
• Algebraic aggregation theory
• On the symmetric and weighted Shapley values
• A new axiomatization of the Shapley value
• Weighted values and the core
• On an axiomatization of the Banzhaf value without the additivity axiom

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