Airport problems and consistent allocation rules.

DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(99)00004-9zbMath1111.91310OpenAlexW1985612885MaRDI QIDQ1303885

Peter Schölter, Jos A. M. Potters

Publication date: 22 September 1999

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-4896(99)00004-9

zbMATH Keywords

Airport gameAirport problemModified nucleolusNucleolusWeighted Shapley value

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80)

Related Items (max. 100)

A noncooperative view on two airport cost sharing rules ⋮ Operations research games: A survey. (With comments and rejoinder) ⋮ Coincidence of the Shapley value with other solutions satisfying covariance ⋮ On the 1-nucleolus ⋮ Consistent queueing rules ⋮ Axiomatic and strategic justifications for the constrained equal benefits rule in the airport problem ⋮ Sharing a collective probability of success ⋮ A characterization of the nucleolus without homogeneity in airport problems ⋮ Cost Sharing in Production Economies ⋮ A polynomial rule for the problem of sharing delay costs in PERT networks ⋮ A study of the nucleolus in the nested cost-sharing problem: axiomatic and strategic perspectives ⋮ A non-cooperative interpretation of the kernel ⋮ Characterizations of highway toll pricing methods ⋮ Sharing the proceeds from a hierarchical venture ⋮ On the core and nucleolus of directed acyclic graph games ⋮ A simple algorithm for the nucleolus of airport profit games ⋮ Consistency and its converse: an introduction ⋮ Sequentially compatible payoffs and the core in TU-games ⋮ A non-cooperative mechanism for the Shapley value of airport problems

Cites Work

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• A characterization, existence proof and dimension bounds for the kernel of a game
• The kernel and bargaining set for convex games
• Geometric Properties of the Kernel, Nucleolus, and Related Solution Concepts
• The Shapley Value as Aircraft Landing Fees–Revisited
• Serial Cost Sharing
• A Simple Expression for the Shapley Value in a Special Case
• The Modified Nucleolus as Canonical Representation of Weighted Majority Games
• The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
• The kernel of a cooperative game

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