Anonymous games with binary actions

DOI10.1006/game.1998.0699zbMath0937.91019OpenAlexW2056623179MaRDI QIDQ1304003

Matthias Blonski

Publication date: 5 December 1999

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1998.0699

zbMATH Keywords

equilibrium selectioncontinuum of playersanonymous gameequilibrium characterizationhomogeneous and heterogeneous populationsnetwork/congestion externalities

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Games with infinitely many players (91A07)

Related Items

On the Complexity of Pareto-optimal Nash and Strong Equilibria, A Maximum Principle Approach to a Deterministic Mean Field Game of Control with Absorption, Binary action games: deviation properties, semi-strict equilibria and potentials, Bounding the inefficiency of equilibria in nonatomic congestion games, Reasoning in large games with unboundedly many players, Pure-strategy Nash equilibria in large games: characterization and existence, Query complexity of approximate equilibria in anonymous games, On the complexity of Pareto-optimal Nash and strong equilibria, Cooperation, punishment and immigration, Evolutionary dynamics in heterogeneous populations: a general framework for an arbitrary type distribution, Best-reply dynamics in large binary-choice anonymous games, DYNAMICS OF CHOICE RESTRICTION IN LARGE GAMES, Sparse covers for sums of indicators, Approximate Nash equilibria in anonymous games, The women of Cairo: equilibria in large anonymous games, Subgames within large games and the heuristic of imitation, Optimal exercise strategies for corporate warrants, Dynamic Restriction of Choices: Synthesis of Societal Rules, Characterization of pure strategy equilibria infinite anonymous games, A Mean Field Game of Optimal Portfolio Liquidation

Cites Work

• On a theorem of Schmeidler
• A direct proof of the existence of pure strategy equilibria in games with a continuum of players
• Equilibrium points of nonatomic games
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games