Sowing doubt optimally in two-person repeated games

DOI10.1006/game.1998.0695zbMath0952.91013OpenAlexW2037054981MaRDI QIDQ1304007

Eitan Israeli

Publication date: 5 December 1999

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1998.0695

zbMATH Keywords

incomplete informationtwo-person repeated gamemaximal minimum payoff

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (5)

Bayesian repeated games and reputation ⋮ Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence ⋮ Repeated Games with Incomplete Information ⋮ Merging, reputation, and repeated games with incomplete information ⋮ Sowing doubt optimally in two-person repeated games

Cites Work

• An analog of the minimax theorem for vector payoffs
• Sowing doubt optimally in two-person repeated games
• Nonzero-sum two-person repeated games with incomplete information and known-own payoffs
• Reputation in perturbed repeated games
• On the Stackelberg strategy in nonzero-sum games
• Nonzero-Sum Two-Person Repeated Games with Incomplete Information
• Reputation and Commitment in Two-Person Repeated Games Without Discounting
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