An asymptotic solution for sealed bid common-value auctions with bidders having asymmetric information

DOI10.1006/game.1998.0693zbMath1115.91321OpenAlexW2069866344MaRDI QIDQ1304009

Robert L. Slonim, Michael Chris Laskowski

Publication date: 5 December 1999

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1998.0693

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items

Common value auctions with asymmetric bidder information, Information Asymmetries in Common-Value Auctions with Discrete Signals, Equilibrium and revenue in a family of common-value first-price auctions with differential information, Private value perturbations and informational advantage in common value auctions, Can the seller benefit from an insider in common-value auctions?

Cites Work

• Competitive bidding and proprietary information
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Note—Competitive Bidding with Asymmetric Information Reanalyzed
• Auctions for Oil and Gas Leases with an Informed Bidder and a Random Reservation Price