Characterizing natural implementability: The fair and Walrasian correspondences

DOI10.1006/GAME.1998.0703zbMath0959.91043OpenAlexW2043921458MaRDI QIDQ1304011

Tatsuyoshi Saijo, Takehiko Yamato, Yoshikatsu Tatamitani

Publication date: 5 December 1999

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1998.0703

zbMATH Keywords

social choice correspondenceexchange economiesconstrained Walrasian correspondencenatural implementability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (6)

Triple implementation by sharing mechanisms in production economies with unequal labor skills ⋮ A full characterization of Nash implementation with strategy space reduction ⋮ Natural implementation with semi-responsible agents in pure exchange economies ⋮ Binary mechanism for the allocation problem with single-dipped preferences ⋮ Nash implementation of competitive equilibria in the job-matching market ⋮ Natural implementation in public goods economies

Cites Work

• Undominated Nash implementation in bounded mechanisms
• A characterization of the Walras rule
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Toward Natural Implementation
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• Unnamed Item

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