Strategy-proof social choice with continuous separable preferences
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Publication:1304442
DOI10.1016/S0304-4068(98)00037-8zbMath0957.91039OpenAlexW2080519037WikidataQ127579750 ScholiaQ127579750MaRDI QIDQ1304442
John A. Weymark, Michel Le Breton
Publication date: 14 November 2000
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-4068(98)00037-8
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