Contract-intensive money: Contract enforcement, property rights, and economic performance

DOI10.1023/A:1009854405184zbMath0933.91029OpenAlexW2155751914MaRDI QIDQ1304786

Mancur Olson, Philip Keefer, Christopher Clague, Stephen Knack

Publication date: 22 September 1999

Published in: Journal of Economic Growth (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1009854405184

zbMATH Keywords

economic growthproperty rightsgovernancecontract enforcement

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economic growth models (91B62)

Related Items (1)

Property and contract rights in autocracies and democracies

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