Pure-strategy equilibria with non-expected utility players

DOI10.1023/A:1005099306184zbMath0937.91013OpenAlexW2150478795MaRDI QIDQ1305621

Ho-Chyuan Chen, William S. Neilson

Publication date: 22 September 1999

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1005099306184

zbMATH Keywords

game theoryrisknon-expected utilitypure strategies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10)

Related Items (6)

When the Players Are Not Expectation Maximizers ⋮ Nash was a first to axiomatize expected utility ⋮ Minimizing expectation plus variance ⋮ Evolutionary stability of prospect theory preferences ⋮ Equilibrium Notions for Agents with Cumulative Prospect Theory Preferences ⋮ \(\mu\)-\(\sigma\) games

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