Rationalizability and equilibrium in \(N\)-person sequential bargaining

DOI10.1007/s001990050298zbMath0939.91015OpenAlexW2010060939MaRDI QIDQ1306640

Vincent J. Vannetelbosch

Publication date: 5 October 1999

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990050298

zbMATH Keywords

rationalizabilitysequential bargaining\(N\)-person

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (7)

Bargaining in endogenous trading networks ⋮ Rationalizability in general situations ⋮ BOUNDED RATIONALITY AND ALTERNATING-OFFER BARGAINING ⋮ Social rationalizability with mediation ⋮ Delay in a bargaining game with contracts ⋮ AN n-PERSON RUBINSTEIN BARGAINING GAME ⋮ A multi-agent bilateral bargaining model with endogenous protocol

This page was built for publication: Rationalizability and equilibrium in \(N\)-person sequential bargaining