The reeded edge and the Phillips curve: Money neutrality, common knowledge, and subjective beliefs
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Publication:1306760
DOI10.1006/jeth.1999.2533zbMath0943.91036OpenAlexW2158640325MaRDI QIDQ1306760
Publication date: 5 October 1999
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1999.2533
Related Items (3)
Money illusion and coordination failure ⋮ The probability of pluralistic ignorance ⋮ Volatile policy and private information: The case of monetary shocks
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