Simple subscription mechanisms for excludable public goods

DOI10.1006/JETH.1998.2497zbMath0943.91033OpenAlexW1969019243MaRDI QIDQ1306761

Parimal Kanti Bag, Eyal Winter

Publication date: 5 October 1999

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/43f91fb01c9044d80a0fa66b09d53a1a385527a4

zbMATH Keywords

excludable public goodsequilibrium outcomessubscriptions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18) Consumer behavior, demand theory (91B42)

Related Items (8)

An efficient and egalitarian negotiation procedure for economies with externalities ⋮ A non-cooperative approach to the ordinal Shapley-Shubik rule ⋮ A non-cooperative approach to the folk rule in minimum cost spanning tree problems ⋮ A sequential bargaining protocol for land rental arrangements ⋮ Forming coalitions and the Shapley NTU value ⋮ Bidding for the surplus: realizing efficient outcomes in economic environments ⋮ Efficient and stable collective choices under gregarious preferences ⋮ Subscription mechanisms for network formation.

Cites Work

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• Subgame Perfect Implementation
• Provision of Public Goods: Fully Implementing the Core through Private Contributions
• Serial Cost-Sharing of Excludable Public Goods
• Joint Projects without Commitment

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