A note on the Seller's optimal mechanism in bilateral trade with two-sided incomplete information

DOI10.1006/jeth.1999.2532zbMath0946.91016OpenAlexW2116981497MaRDI QIDQ1306770

Okan Yilankaya

Publication date: 25 October 2000

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/efb02288bc7e879c6168aa2d293213bc39f0128a

zbMATH Keywords

incomplete informationbilateral trade problemstake-it-or-leave-it

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (12)

Informed seller with taste heterogeneity ⋮ FOR-PROFIT SEARCH PLATFORMS ⋮ Informed-principal problems in environments with generalized private values ⋮ Informed principal problems in bilateral trading ⋮ On the equivalence of information design by uninformed and informed principals ⋮ Informed-principal problem with moral hazard, risk neutrality, and no limited liability ⋮ On the informed seller problem: optimal information disclosure ⋮ Investment incentives in bilateral trading ⋮ Ratifiability of efficient collusive mechanisms in second-price auctions with participation costs ⋮ An efficient solution to the informed principal problem ⋮ The strategically ignorant principal ⋮ Selling with evidence

Cites Work

• Efficient performance in two agent bargaining
• Equilibria of the sealed-bid mechanism for bargaining with incomplete information
• Bilateral trade with the sealed bid k-double auction: Existence and efficiency
• Pre-play communication in two-person sealed-bid double auctions
• Efficient trading mechanisms with pre-play communication
• Bargaining under Incomplete Information
• The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private Values
• Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal

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